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I. INTRODUCTION
Like the moon across the night sky, the immunity defense has waxed and
waned across the ever changing horizon of American tort law. Immunity originally
was a creation of the judiciary.' The grant of immunity represented a policy
determination that a certain defendant should be excused from tort liability because
of its status, i.e. who or what it was. Thus, the sovereign was absolutely immune
from tort liability based on its need to provide necessary public services and the
fiction that the sovereign, as the creator of its courts, could not be sued in them
without its consent." Charities, most notably hospitals, were immunized from
liability in tort because of the belief that immunity would encourage people to
undertake charitable endeavors. Spouses were immune from tort liability to each
other because of the perceived need to preserve family harmony which, the
common law reasoned, intra-family tort suits would disrupt." All of these entities
and people were immunized because of their status.
In modem times, beginning about the middle of the twentieth century, the
courts which had created these immunities began to destroy them.! The
judiciary found ways to circumvent the various immunities it had created6 and
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1. See, e.g.. Feafees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846). American courts
followed this decision and established a general doctrine that charities were immune from tort
liability.
2. McMahan v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 72 S. Ct. 17 (1951); United States v. Nardic
Village, Inc.. 503 U.S. 30, 112 S. Ct 1011 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Manguson v. Swedish Hospital, 169 P. 828 (Wash. 1918); W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 133 (5th ed. 1984).
4. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S. Ct. i1 (1910) (barring personal
actions); Smith v. Gorman, 41 Me. 405 (1856) (barring property damage tort claims). Additionally,
in Louisiana, parents were (and are) immune from tort actions brought by (on behalf of) their minor
children. La. R.S. 9:571 (1991).
5. W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 3, § 131.
6. See, e.g., Howard v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 193 F. Supp. 191, 192 (D. Mont.
1961) (cataloguing such circumvention, which includes limiting the immunity to nonpaying
customers, to where there was no negligence in selection of employees, and to where the charitable
institution did not have insurance).
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in many cases abolished them altogether. The abolition or limitation of
sovereign immunity was accomplished not only by judicial decision7 but by
legislative s and Constitutional' action as well. Louisiana, like her common law
neighbors, struck hard at the traditional immunities. The Louisiana Supreme
Court abolished charitable immunity,' and the people, in the Constitution of
1974, waived sovereign immunity from tort and contract claims." Interspousal
immunity has only partially survived in Louisiana; during marriage, the spouses
are immune from suit against each other, but one spouse may bring a direct
action against the other's liability insurer.1 2
But just as traditional immunity appears to be finally fading from the tort
horizon, new moons of immunity are appearing. Unlike their predecessors, these
new post-modem immunities are legislatively created. Moreover, unlike the
traditional immunities, these new immunities do not insulate from tort liability
broad classes of persons, such as all charities or all spouses. Instead, in many
cases they protect narrowly defined classes of persons, such as members of
downtown development districts, 3 volunteer athletic coaches, 4 recreational
land owners," poison control centers, 6 and others.17 In addition, these new
immunities do not protect their beneficiaries from all tort liability but only from
certain types of liability, typically negligence and strict liability.' The
immunity is lost if the defendant's conduct rises above negligence to some
7. See, e.g., Colby v. Carney Hospital, 254 N.E.2d 407 (Mass. 1969); Howle v. Camp Aman
Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (rex. 1971).
8. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § I - 539.9; ILI. - G.L. 1956, § 9-1-26 (hospitals).
9. See Infra note II.
10. Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So. 2d 88 (La. 1974).
11. La. Const. art. XIi, § 10. A Supreme Court opinion expanding the waiver of sovereign
immunity, see Chamberlain v. State, 624 So. 2d 874 (La. 993), has been overturned by a
constitutional amendment and implementing legislation. See 1995 La. Acts No. 828, which submitted
to the people the subsequently approved Article XII, Sec. 10(c) of the Louisiana Constitution which
gives the legislature the power to regulate the tort liability of the state. As part of Act 828, the
legislature also reenacted a set of governmental limited liability statutes. The legislature has
continued to tinker in this area. See 1996 La. Acts No. 63.
12. Through the direct action statute, La. R.S. 22:655 (1978 and Supp. 1989), Louisiana
preserves the interspousal immunity by allowing one spouse to sue the other's liability insurer
directly. Guillot v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), writ dismissed,
341 So. 2d 408 (1977). When the legislature amended the direct action statute to require that in a
direct action against an insurance company the plaintiff must also name the insured, it exempted
cases where the insured was immune from suit. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978 and Supp. 1989).
13. La. R.S. 9:2792.2 (1991).
14. La. R.S. 9:2798 (1991). Receipt of a small stipend does not forfeit "volunteer" status. La.
R.S. 9:2798 (1991).
15. La. R.S. 9:2791, 2795 (1991).
16. La. R.S. 9:2797.1 (1991).
17. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:2798.2 (1991).
18. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:2796.1 (Supp. 1995) (limiting all liability of any organization
presenting St. Patrick's Day Parades unless the loss or damage results from gross negligence or from
a wanton act).
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heightened level of fault such as gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional
tort."
9
With its ever changing phases one may justifiably examine immunity's place
in the larger sky of American tort law. Immunity may be viewed as one aspect
of the "duty/risk" or scope of duty issue inherent in every tort case. There are
always four core issues in the imposition of tort liability: (1) whether the
plaintiff's injuries were caused-in-fact by defendant's conduct, (2) whether the
defendant's conduct, activity, or relationship to the injury-causing thing or person
mandates imposition of liability (i.e., has defendant breached the appropriate
standard of conduct), (3) whether the liability extends to the kind of injury which
occurred in the manner in which it occurred, and (4) the extent (monetary value)
of the plaintiff's injuries. As a closer look reveals, the third issue-the
"duty/risk" question-is at the heart of tort immunity.
Tort concepts generally will broadly "condemn" certain conduct, holding that
a person who acts in a certain way (issue 2 above) and causes (issue 1) damages
(issue 4) is liable to the person who suffers those damages. But when that broad
rule is applied to a particular actor and victim in a particular lawsuit, the same
societal policies which generated the rule may caution against imposition of
liability. This is the essence of issue 3. A court must examine the specific
circumstances and determine whether liability should be imposed upon this
defendant to this plaintiff for these damages occurring in this manner. This
"specific risk" inquiry generally is made at the "duty" or "legal causation" level,
where it causes confusion and often frustration to the law student, lawyer, and
judge. However, the same inquiry may be made at the "immunity" level. For
example, part of the duty/risk inquiry is whether this defendant owes a duty to
this plaintiff. Under traditional immunity concepts, the court made a determina-
tion that certain classes of defendants did not owe duties to avoid tortious injury.
Put differently, this defendant, if immune, did not owe a duty to the plaintiff.
Consequently there was no need to inquire further, even though that inquiry, if
it had been made, would have revealed that the defendant in fact had engaged
in risky behavior which caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries which otherwise
would have been compensable.
One difference in making the "specific risk" inquiry under the rubric of
immunity rather than through a duty or causation inquiry is the burden of
persuasion. Duty and causation are elements of the plaintiff's claim, but
immunity generally is treated as an affirmative defense which the defendant must
plead and prove."0 However, establishing one of the traditional tort immunities
was generally a rather easy task. If the defendant was a charity it ordinarily was
simple to establish that fact, and the defendant then was entitled to a summary
19. Id.; see also La. R.S. 40:1235 (1992) (limiting the liability of emergency medical
technicians unless their actions were intentional of grossly negligent).
20. See, e.g., Conques v. Hardy, 337 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (treating judicial
immunity as an affirmative defense).
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determination in its favor, i.e. dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. Thus, broad
traditional immunities had the advantage of being administratively convenient
because they avoided trials, but they turned otherwise deserving plaintiffs away
from the courthouse without recovery. Broad immunity was equated with a
determination that the defendant effectively did not owe a duty to the plaintiff
and that the plaintiff was precluded from getting a judge or jury to consider the
particular details of his or her case. The details of the particular plaintiff's story
were shrouded beneath the broad cloak of the defendant's status-oriented
immunity defense. But what about the post-modem immunity rules?
While duty and causation are generally governed by judicially crafted rules,
post-modem immunity has sprung from legislation. Thus, the "specific risk"
inquiry at the immunity level requires statutory construction. More importantly, it
involves interpretation of statutes which were usually generated by "special
interest" groups seeking to escape liability under various judicially developed tort
doctrines. The fact that these new immunities are legislatively created suggests that
a court in a civil law jurisdiction should strive to effectuate the legislative will. On
the other hand, the fact that these immunity statutes constitute "special interest"
protection limiting the general right of an injured victim to recover in tort from an
at-fault party suggests a strict or narrow construction. This dual but conflicting
perspective on interpretation suggests the potential for conflict and disagreement.
Moreover, while Louisiana's post-modem immunities are also status-based,
they generally protect narrower classes than traditional immunities, and they allow
the plaintiff to recover if he or she can establish that the defendant's conduct was
more blameworthy than mere negligence. Looked at from a duty/risk focus, the
immunity is lost if the defendant's actions are sufficiently egregious. Consequent-
ly, below that level of fault the manner in which the accident occurs mandates that
the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty, i.e. it is immune. However, above that
level the circumstances are such that the defendant does owe the plaintiff a legal
duty, and traditional tort analysis must be applied to determine if the defendant is
liable to the plaintiff.
Some of the confusion surrounding the concept of immunity no doubt has
been caused by the fact that tort immunity has appeared in several different
forms, all often indiscriminately called "immunity" with little or no further
discussion. Immunity essentially may prevent a tort from arising; sovereign
immunity is the classic example here. The defendant is immune from liability
for all torts because of who it is-an "across the board," status-oriented freedom
from tort liability. In the duty/risk parlance, the defendant owes no duty
regardless of the circumstances. This type of immunity rarely survives today.
In another type of immunity, the tort arises but the immunity suspends judicial
enforcement for a period of time. In Louisiana, the interspousa 21 and parental
immunities22 are the most common of these. The tort is committed but it may
21. La. R.S. 9:291 (1991).
22. La. R.S. 9:571 (1991).
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not be enforced against the tortfeasor during the pendency of the immunity-
triggering relationship." However, prescription also may be suspended during
the existence of the key relationship." In a third kind of immunity, as
discussed above, the actor is immune from some kinds of tortious conduct but
not others. The employer's immunity is the best known example. An employer
generally is immune from tort liability for his negligent injury to an employee
but since 19762 the immunity is lost if the employer's fault reaches the
egregious level of intent.26 The employer's immunity (and its inapplicability
to intentional torts) is paradigmatic of recent Louisiana immunity legislation,
27
which reveals the "form" of many of Louisiana's post-modem immunity statutes.
Unlike some of the other post-modem immunities, the employer immunity
protects a broad class, all employers. A fourth kind of tort immunity limits the
amount of damages the actor must pay or the manner of payment. This is
reflected in statutes limiting the amount of tort liability of public bodies s and
health care providers.29 It also appears in statutes "structuring" the payment of
certain damages in future installments against both governmental entities30 and
qualified health care providers. 3' Finally, one may view as immunity statutes
those which shorten the tort prescriptive periods32 or which establish peremptive
periods33 for certain claims against certain defendants. Because immunity
23. See, e.g., Myhre v. Erler, 575 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (interspousal immunity
does not bar suit after divorce even though it was filed before divorce).
24. La. Civ. Code art. 3469; Schexnayder v. Schexnayder. 451 So. 2d 1192 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1984).
25. 1976 La. Acts No. 147 (amending La. R.S. 23:1032).
26. La. R.S. 23:1032 (1991).
27. Actually, La. R.S. 9:2791 (1991) and 9:2795 (1991) (the recreational landowner immunity
statutes) predate the intentional act exception to employer immunity. Both of those statutes limit
immunity to conduct that is not "malicious." However, while the recreational land statutes may be
the earliest examples of "limited" immunity legislation, the employer's immunity and the intentional
act exception have attracted and demand more practical attention.
28. La R.S. 13:5106 (Supp. 1996). An initial "ceiling" on the sovereign's liability for tort
damages was declared unconstitutional in Chamberlain v. State, 624 So. 2d 874 (La. 1993). The
1995 constitutional amendment allowed the legislature to place limits upon the sovereign's liability.
The amendment presumably validates the new $500,000 "cap" (see 1996 La. Acts No. 63); however,
suits filed against the sovereign prior to Jan. 1, 1996, probably are not subject to any "cap." See,
e.g., Begnaud v. DOTD, 631 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 675 So. 2d 1087 (1996);
Holt v. State, 671 So. 2d 1164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996).
29. See La. R.S. 40:1299.42 (1992) (limiting malpractice liability of health care providers and
Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund to $500,000, exclusive of future medical care and related
benefits).
30. See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:5114 (1996) (structuring payment of a judgment or compromise
against the state or its political subdivisions).
31. La. R.S. 40:1299.43 (1991) (regarding payment of future medical expenses).
32. La. R.S. 9:5628 (1991 & 1996 Supp).
33. See, e.g., La. R.S. 6:1191 (Supp. 1995) (creating a peremption for claims against officers
or directors of a savings bank), La. R.S. 9:5605 (1991 & Supp. 1996), and La. R.S. 9:5606 (Supp.
1996).
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statutes treat certain actors or victims, or both, differently from other actors or
victims, immunities present nice questions of constitutional law, some of which
are as yet unanswered."
This article focuses upon the most important of all Louisiana immunities, the
employer's immunity from non-intentional work place torts. Not only is the
immunity practically significant in its own right, but the manner in which the courts
approach the scope and applicability of the employer's immunity may provide the
best insight into how they will treat the post-modem wave of limited immunity
statutes. Moreover, the employer immunity jurisprudence nicely illustrates the
omnipresence of the duty/risk mode of analysis in the field of immunity.
In the sections which follow we strive to do several things. First, we provide
the bench and bar with practical information concerning this most important of all
Louisiana immunities. Second, we examine the employer's immunity as the model
for other post-modem immunities with which Louisiana courts must now deal.
Finally, we attempt to demonstrate how employer immunity issues may be seen as
duty/risk or scope of duty issues.
II. THE EMPLOYER'S IMMUNITY
The most significant and most volatile of tort immunities is that which the
employer enjoys for workplace injuries to his or her employee. Given the
magnitude (both in number and severity) of workplace injuries, it is not surprising
that the employer's immunity has generated an avalanche of litigation and a galaxy
of jurisprudence. The genesis of the immunity is statutory" and the story of the
immunity's legislative creation is critical to an understanding of how courts have
treated it. Prior to the turn of the twentieth century, the common law imposed upon
the employer a duty to exercise reasonable care to provide a safe work place to its
employees-a duty not to be negligent. However, the scope of that duty was
drastically limited by the defenses available to employers sued in tort by their
employees. The employer, despite its duty to provide a safe work place, was
effectively "immunized" from liability through contributory negligence, assumption
of the risk, and the fellow servant rule. 6 This state of affairs led to progressive
legislation codifying the employer's obligation to provide a safe work place and
creating worker's compensation, a form of "absolute" liability imposed upon the
employer for limited benefits (traditionally two-thirds of the employee's weekly
wages during the period of disability and medical expenses)." These benefits
34. Others are resolved. See, e.g., Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc. 668 So. 2d 1135 (La.
1996) (the extension of tort immunity beyond a direct employer does not violate rights to equal
protection under the Louisiana Constitution).
35. La. R.S. 23:1032 (1991).
36. These three defenses created the "unholy trinity," which made recovery for work-related
injuries uncommon. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1979).
37. See, e.g., Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Worker's Compensation §§ 1 and 32,
in 13 La. Civil Law Treaties (1980 and Supp. 1993).
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generally were recoverable when the employee was accidentally injured during the
course and scope of employment and the injury arose out of the employment.38
In exchange for this absolute "no fault" recovery, the employee forfeited the right
to maintain an action for tort damages against the employer. 39 To use a Latin
term, the legislature struck a "quid pro quo" compromise: the employee received
an absolute right to recover limited benefits in exchange for the employer's tort
immunity. In duty/risk parlance, the employer traded in its tort duty for no tort duty
but an absolute obligation to provide limited worker's compensation benefits.
The employer's liability was conditioned upon the employee's "accidental"
workplace injury; however, if the employer's injuring conduct was "intentional,"
the resulting injury was not "accidental," compensation was not due, and there
was no corresponding immunity from tort damages.40 In post-modem
terminology, the immunity was limited; it did not extend to intentional torts. If
the tort was intentional, a tort duty was owed and breached.
An accidental injury is compensable under the worker compensation statutes
if it occurs in the course and scope of employment, 41 arises out of the
employment,'42 and disables43 the employee (or prevents him or her from
earning 90%" of his or her pre-accident wages). The "course and scope"
requirement employs the same language courts use in determining whether a
master (employer) is vicariously liable for the torts of his servant (employee).",
In both contexts the court is attempting to determine whether the risk of injury
to the employee in the compensation context or to a third person in the vicarious
liability context is one which is attributable to the employer's enterprise.
Generally, when used in the worker's compensation context, "course and
scope" refers to the time and place of the accident,' and "arising out of'
focuses upon the risk involved.'7 Is that risk employment related? Is the
employee, because of his employment, exposed to the risk more than other
38. See, e.g., Turpin v. Turpin Electric, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
39. See Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994); Baunhill v. American Well Service
and Salvage, Inc., 432 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
40. Cf Li v. C. N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606 (Me. 1994) (workers' compensation statute no
longer requires injuries to have been accidental under the Act).
41. See, e.g., La. ILS. 23:1031 (Supp. 1995).
42. La. R.S. 23:1031 (Supp. 1995).
43. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sline Indus. Painters, Inc., 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982); King v. Wilson
Bros. Drilling Co., 441 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 443 So. 2d 598 (La. 1983);
Poindexter v. South Coast Corp., 204 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
44. La. R.S. 23:1221 (1991 & Supp. 1996); Pinkins v. Cardinal Wholesale Supply, Inc., 619
So. 2d 52 (La. 1993).
45. See, e.g., Reed v. House of Decor, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1159 (La. 1985).
46. See, e.g., Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 108 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1958).
47. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sline Industrial Painters, Inc., 418 So. 2d 626 (La. 1982). The Guidry
cburt explained that "(airising out of employment contemplates the accidents being the result of some
risk'to which the employee is subjected in the course of his employment and to which he would not
have been subjected had he not been so employed." Id. at 628.
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persons are?'8 The employee seeking compensation (and the employer claiming
tort immunity) must establish both the "course and scope" and "arising out of'
elements. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court views those elements as if
they were along a continuum. They must be construed together, and a relatively
weak showing on one requirement may be overcome by a strong showing on the
other."
Theoretically, the "course and scope"/"arising out of" requirements may be
seen, from a duty/risk prospective, as the manner in which the accident occurred.
Put differently, an employer (this defendant) owes no non-intentional tort duty
to the employee (this plaintiff) if the accident occurred during the course and
scope of employment and arose out of the employment (this manner)." Of
course, the result changes if the manner changes, such as if the employee was
not in the course and scope of employment, or the injury did not arise out of the
employment. In such case, the employer may owe a tort duty to the employee
to protect against the relevant injury. Whether it does so depends upon general
tort law, not upon immunity. Interestingly, the risk is analyzed first to see if it
arose out of employment (a type of duty/risk analysis). If it did, the employer
is immune from a non-intentional tort suit. If it did not, then the manner in
which the accident occurred defeats the employer's immunity defense. Then, the
court must engage in a duty/risk analysis to see if the employee may recover in
tort. Let us examine some of these concerns a little more closely.
What happens when there may be employer fault and it is not clear that the
injury occurred in the "course and scope" of employment and "arose out of' the
employment? In such a case, the employee may elect to proceed in tort rather
than seek worker compensation because of the more generous recovery available.
Thus, the lawyer representing the injured employee must proceed with caution
because proving one's entitlement to proceed in tort may foreclose a later
compensation claim arising out of the same conduct. In close cases, a court may
find the employee "in" or "out" of the course and scope, depending upon
whether the result will provide some kind of compensation to the employee for
his injury. This is particularly true in those cases, largely fact specific, in which
the employee is injured near his or her work station shortly before or after the
work shift. A court may find the employee "outside the course and scope of
employment" if there is employer or solvent third party fault, but "inside" if
48. Id.
49. Mundy v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 593 So. 2d 346 (La. 1992).
50. This conclusion is somewhat troublesome after 1996 La. Acts No. 3. Now, when an injured
worker sues a third party tortfeasor, the tortfeasor is entitled to have fault allocated to an at fault
employer. The statement in the text about "no duty" to the employee should not be read to indicate
the employer in a third party tort suit is not at fault. Our "no duty" statement should not influence
such cases. It is made to show the possibility of analyzing all tort problems from the duty/risk
perspective. But merely because a plaintiff (the employee) cannot recover from a defendant (the
employer) does not mean that "fault" may not be allocated to the employer for some other reason.
such as reducing the third party defendant's liability.
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there is none.$1 While this judicial approach generally fosters the societal goal
of compensating the accident victim, the employee may face the "worst case"
scenario: the employer fault and course and scope issues are close ones, but a
court ultimately determines that the employee was outside the course of
employment so the employee can proceed with his tort suit, but the court may
decide the employer was not negligent or the employer's negligence did not
extend to the particular risk. For instance, in Mundy v. State Department of
Health and Human Resources,52 the plaintiff, a nurse working at the then
Charity Hospital in New Orleans, was attacked and stabbed in an elevator at the
hospital while she was en route to the floor on which she worked. Although her
shift had begun about two minutes before the incident, her employer would not
have considered plaintiff as tardy for another several minutes. The court of
appeal decided that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was worker compensation
benefits." The Supreme Court reversed,' thus allowing plaintiff to proceed
in tort against her employer. Then, on remand, the court of appeal concluded
that the employer did not owe a duty to protect plaintiff (or anyone else) from
the risk which occurred." Consequently, plaintiff was unable to recover in
tort.' One assumes that the Supreme Court's decision that Mundy's injury did
not arise out of and/or occur in the course and scope of her employment also
precluded any subsequent recovery of compensation benefits.
The message of Mundy is clear. The lawyer must be aware that if a
workplace injury does not occur in the course and scope of employment and
arise out of the employment, the employee may have a tort claim against the
employer. Alternatively, a decision to pursue tort recovery also may effectively
foreclose a later claim for compensation benefits. Mundy also brings to mind
51. Stewart v. Louisiana Plant Service, Inc., 611 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ
denied, 616 So. 2d 706 (La. 1993).
52. 593 So. 2d 346 (La. 1992).
53. Mundy v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 580 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1991), reversed, 593 So. 2d 346 (1992).
54. Mundy v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 593 So. 2d 346 (La. 1992).
55. Mundy v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 609 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1992).
56. Cf. Bosse v. Westinghouse Electric Inc., 637 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
642 So. 2d 878 (1994) (employee injured in elevator at his office building 45 minutes before shift
began was in course and scope of employment at the time of the injury); Stewart v. Louisiana Plant
Service, Inc., 611 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied, 616 So. 2d 706 (1993);
Tuminello v. Willis Knighton Medical Center, 597 So. 2d 1089 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 600
So. 2d 684 (1992) (exclusive remedy in comp). For Professor Maraist's synopses of these cases, see
Frank L. Maraist, Louisiana Tort Law: Cases and Materials 362-63 (1995 ed.). See also May v.
Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 651 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 654 So. 2d
329 (1995). More recently, the Supreme Court held that, under La. R.S. 23:1031(D), a gas station
worker shot by her husband while she was on the job was not entitled to workers' compensation
benefits. The source of her injury was a personal "dispute." Justice Johnson dissented. Guillory v.
Interstate Gas Station, 653 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1995). After the holding, one wonders whether Ms.
Guillory might have asserted a tort claim against her employer.
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another practical ramification of the "arising out of/course and scope of
employment" requirements. The employee who seeks worker's compensation
benefits bears the burden of proving that the accidental injury occurred in and
arose out of the course and scope of employment. However, if the employee
seeks tort recovery from the employer and the employer claims immunity under
the compensation statute's exclusive remedy provision, the employer bears the
burden of proving that the employee's accidental injury arose out of and occurred
in the course and scope of employment. Likewise, Mundy reminds us of the
importance of scope of duty analysis in this area. The court of appeal had
concluded that because of the manner in which the accident occurred regarding
course and scope and arising out of employment, the employer did not owe the
employee a duty in tort (negligence) but was immune. The duty owed was to
provide workers' compensation benefits. The Supreme Court disagreed,
concluding that the manner in which the accident occurred was such that a duty
in tort might be owed; at least there was no immunity. After this determination
was made, the case became an ordinary tort case, albeit one by an employee.
Sadly for the plaintiff, the courts decided that the employer's duty to exercise
reasonable care did not include the risk which occurred. Therefore, at the end
of the day in Mundy, the employer did not owe Ms. Mundy any duty (no tort
duty and no duty to provide compensation benefits).
An employer seeking to establish immunity must not only show that the
employee's accidental injury occurred in the course and scope of employment
and arose out of the employment, but also must establish the other requirements
for payment of worker compensation. If the injury is not compensable (such as
when it is excluded because of employee misconduc 7 or because the employee
cannot meet the heightened requirement of proof of disability"8 ), the employer
has no tort immunity. As noted earlier, the imposition of compensation liability
on employers and the corresponding grant of tort immunity was a quid pro quo.
However, if there is no "quid" of compensation benefits, there is no correspond-
ing "quo" of immunity. This "coverage" issue is another aspect of the "manner"
in which the injury occurred. If the manner of the accident was such that the
employee could recover compensation benefits, the employer does not owe the
employee a tort duty to guard against non-intentional torts. If there is no
coverage then a tort duty may be owed depending upon the facts as analyzed
from a tort rather than a compensation perspective.
This "compensable injury" issue has taken on added significance since 1989
when the legislature drastically rewrote the worker's compensation statutes to
make it more difficult for employees to recover benefits. 9 For example, an
57. See, e.g., La. R.S. 23:1208 (Supp. 1995) (providing that misrepresentation in obtaining or
defeating any benefit or payment forfeits claimants rights to benefits).
58. See, e.g., La. R.S. 23:1221(lXc) (Supp. 1995) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of
temporary total disability, unavoided by any presumption of disability), Campbell v. Luke
Construction Co.. 465 So. 2d 688 (La. 1985).
59. 1989 La. Acts No. 454.
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employer is not liable for certain workplace injuries unless the employee can
demonstrate the right to recover benefits by "clear and convincing" evidence. 6
What if the employee cannot meet that burden of proof, but the employer's
negligence was a cause-in-fact of the workplace injury? Because the injury is
not compensable, there is no "quid" for the "quo," and the employer is not
immune from tort liability. However, there is a duty in tort, and the employer
must pay tort damages to his employee for a negligently caused workplace
injury. The courts have reached this result on several occasions.6
The employer's "no quid/no quo" exposure to tort liability undoubtedly is
a judicial response to the severe restrictions on worker compensation recovery
imposed by late twentieth century legislation. Another judicial response to this
anti-compensation legislation is to interpret such statutes narrowly and thus
expand compensation coverage. Absent expansion of coverage, the employee
who suffers a workplace injury in which there is arguably employer fault and
which is on the "fringe" of coverage for worker compensation benefits may take
two strategic "bites" at the apple. He first may claim compensation and, if
unsuccessful, he may then seek tort damages within a year of the final resolution
of his compensation claim. The tort claim would not be prescribed because the
filing of the compensation claim would interrupt prescription on the tort claim.'2
60. See, e.g., La. R.S. 23:1221(lXc) (Supp. 1995).
61. One of the hottest current areas for brouhahas over the coverage/tort issue relates to heart
attacks and perivascular injuries. See La. R.S. 23:1021(7Xe) (Supp. 1996). In Hunt v. Milton J.
Womack, Inc., 616 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 623 So. 2d 1309 (1993), a panel of
the first circuit held that a worker who suffered a heart attack for which no coverage was provided
under the new heart attack statute was entitled to proceed in tort against the employer. In a footnote,
note 17, in a later case, Charles v. Travelers Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d 1366, 1372 n.17 (La. 1993), the
Louisiana Supreme Court apparently endorsed the reasoning in Hunt. Justice Marcus concurred. 627
So. 2d 1366, 1372 (Marcus, J., concurring). While Justice Marcus agreed with the holding of the
case itself (a stroke is a perivascular injury under the statute), he disagreed with the footnote
endorsing Hunt. Interestingly, since Charles, the Supreme Court has interpreted the heart attack
statute as providing coverage to a worker with a pre-existing, but unknown, heart condition. Harold
v. La Belle Maison Apartments, 643 So. 2d 752 (La. 1994); see also Debona v. Alexandria Pawn,
649 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994), writ denied, 650 So. 2d 242 (1995).
What if the employee forfeits his or her right to compensation benefits through some misconduct,
such as intoxication or misrepresentation? Does that forfeiture, which means no compensation
benefits, entitle the employee to pursue a tort claim? What if coverage is excluded because it arose
out of a personal dispute? See Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 653 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1995). May
the employee then file suit against the employer for failing to exercise reasonable cam to protect the
employee from the relevant (personal) risk of harm? The answer would seem to depend upon the
law of negligence as the employer's immunity would not bar the suit.
The grandmother of this line of cases in Louisiana is Boyer v. Crescent Paper Box Factory, Inc.,
143 La. 368, 78 So. 596 (La. 1918).
62. See, e.g., Williams v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 611 So. 2d 1383 (La.
1993); Parker v. Southern American Ins. Co., 590 So. 2d 55 (La. 1991). However payment of
compensation benefits may not be an acknowledgement which interrupts prescription. Compare Gary
v. Camden Fire Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 553 (La. 1996) and Cormier v. Clemco Services Corp., 48 F.3d
179 (5th Cir. 1995):
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The two "bites" result from judicial decisions that view the worker compensation
scheme as overly restrictive.
That perception also may partially be the cause of another judicial inroad
into employer immunity. Assuming a compensable injury, the employer's
immunity is limited in several other ways. The most important is that the
employer is not immune from tort suits by the employee if the conduct
chargeable to the employer was an "intentional act."6' 3 He also may not be
immune from tort suits by third persons who are injured by his conduct toward
his employee." A third judicial breach in the employer's wall of immuni-
ty-liability for punitive damages-apparently has been closed by legislative
action.65
As noted above, the employer's liability to the employee for intentional torts
originally arose out of logical interpretations of worker compensation statutes.
Those statutes generally impose liability upon the employer for compensation for
"accidental injury" to the employee." But if the employer intends to harm the
employee, the injury is not "accidental"; thus, there is no compensation coverage
and no corresponding immunity from tort damages. 67 That "intentional tort"
theory did not develop initially in Louisiana, arguably because another approach,
executive officer liability, effectively produced employer tort liability for tortious
workplace conduct causing injury to the employee.
Prior to 1975, in Louisiana the employer was immune from tort liability but
the injuring co-employee was not." Seizing upon this distinction, Louisiana
courts developed the "executive officer" doctrine which permitted an employee
to recover from the employer for co-employee negligence. In duty/risk parlance,
the executive officer conundrum raised a "this" defendant problem. If "this"
defendant was the employer, no duty was owed (assuming coverage). If "this"
defendant was an executive officer, a tort duty was owed. Recovery in such
cases was achieved in this manner: (1) if the employer delegated workplace
safety to a particular employee, that employee owed a tort duty of reasonable
care to fellow employees; 9 (2) the "executive officer" to whom the duty had
been delegated usually was an "omnibus insured" under the employer's liability
63. La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1995); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981); White v.
Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991).
64. See, e.g., Cushing v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ
denied. 556 So. 2d 1281 (1990) (employer not immune from tort suit by child injured in utero by
mother's workplace accident). See also Trahan v. Trans-Louisiana Gas Co., Inc., 618 So. 2d 30 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1993) (tort immunity does not bar claim by worker's spouse that she sustained injuries
from exposure to hazardous chemicals which became attached to her worker-husband's clothing in
workplace).
65. 1995 La. Acts No. 832 (amending La. R.S. 23:1032 to overrule Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645
So. 2d 604 (La. 1994)); 1996 La. Acts No. 2 (repealing La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3).
66. Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994).
67. Malone & Johnson, supra note 37, § 32.
68. Id. at § 365.
69. See, e.g., Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
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insurance policy; (3) under the "direct action" statute, the injured employee could
bring suit against the employer's insurer" (for the "executive officer's negli-
gence") without joining the employer; and (4) the employer's tort immunity did
not extend to its liability insurer.7 Thus, the employer who was absolutely
liable for worker compensation benefits also bore the cost, through increased
liability insurance premiums, of the employee's tort recovery against the injuring
''executive officer."
The legislature changed this result in 1976 when it extended tort immunity
to an injuring co-employee who was in the "normal" course and scope of his
employment.' It made the executive officer a member of the class of "this"
defendant who might be immune. Probably as a trade-off, the same legislation,
however, made both the employer and the injuring employee liable to the injured
employee in tort for an "intentional act."" The Supreme Court quickly chose
the wise interpretation of "intentional act" as synonymous with "intentional tort,"
a concept well developed at common law.74 Under that concept, an actor's
conduct is intentional if: (1) he subjectively desires to invade a protected interest
or (2) he acts under such circumstances that his conduct is "substantially certain"
to invade a protected interest. 75 The "protected interest" may be the victim's
body (battery) or mind (assault or intentional infliction of emotional distress) or
both (false imprisonment). However, the "intentional tort" which falls outside
employer immunity should not be confined to the traditional common law
"categories" of intentional tort; the issue should be whether, under the circum-
stances in which he acted, the employer or injuring employee desired or was
substantially certain that his conduct would invade an interest which the law
protects from intentional invasion. Predictably, many of the cases are close ones
which turn upon the specific facts. While the 1976 legislation expanded the class
of "these defendants" protected by "employer" immunity, by allowing employee
intentional tort suits against employers and co-employees it also dealt with yet
another "this manner" concern. This defendant, employer or co-employee, may
70. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
71. Id.
72. 1976 La. Acts No. 147 (amending La. R.S. 23:1032).
73. The 1976 amendment to La. R.S. 23:1032 provided that the rights and remedies granted
the employee were exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee against any employee
of the employer, but that the immunity did not apply to "any ... employee.., who is not engaged
at the time of the injury in the normal course and scope of his employment."
74. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
75. See La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1995). See also Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987);
Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981). Basically, intent for purposes of the worker's comp
immunity means the same as intent in traditional intentional tort cases, although there has been much
litigation on the intent issue. While the issue of intent is generally beyond the scope of this work,
one should note, in reference to narrow construction, that the fourth circuit has held that where an
employee alleges an intentional tort in a suit against an employer, the trial court may not grant an
exception of no cause of action. McKee v. Inspectorate America Corp., 636 So. 2d 305 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 643 So. 2d 144 (La. 1994).
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owe a duty in tort (intentional tort) to protect this plaintiff employee from the
injuries which occurred if the manner of injury is an intentional tort. If the
manner in which the injury occurred was not an intentional tort then (assuming
compensation coverage) the employer is immune from suit in tort but owes a
duty to provide compensation benefits.
As noted, the injuring co-employee is not immune if his conduct was
intentional. If under respondeat superior principles the injuring employee's
intentional conduct was within the course and scope of his employment,6 the
employer will be vicariously liable for the damages and will not be immune.
Thus in Benoit v. Capitol Manufacturing Co.," two employees bickered over
the temperature in the workplace; one employee wanted a door open to cool the
workplace, and the other wanted the door closed to warm it up. The disagree-
ment accelerated into a scuffle, and the losing employee sued the employer in
tort, claiming that the employer was vicariously liable for the co-employee's
intentional tort. The Supreme Court concluded that although both employees
were in the course and scope of employment for worker compensation purposes,
the injuring employee was not immune because his conduct was intentional.
Moreover, because the injuring employee was acting in the course and scope of
his employment for respondeat superior purposes, the employer was liable to the
injured employee for tort damages. In Benoit the "this manner" aspect of the
duty/risk analysis involved both a co-employee's intentional tort and the
employer's vicarious liability. Once the court determines a co-employee
committed an intentional tort, the vicarious liability issue is a simple tort issue;
immunity does not cloud the analysis.
An employee injured in the course and scope of employment ordinarily will
begin receiving worker compensation payments from his employer or the
employer's compensation insurer within a short time after the injury.
78
Recovery of compensation benefits does not preclude the employee's subsequent
intentional tort suit against the employer; if the employee is successful in the tort
suit, the employer is entitled to a credit for those portions of the worker
compensation benefits which represent items of recoverable tort damages."
What if the conduct falls below the "intentional tort" standard but is more
egregious than ordinary negligence? Louisiana law imposes tort liability for
punitive damages upon persons acting in a "wanton" or "reckless" manner while
engaging in certain activities, such as driving while intoxicated s° and, before
1996, while storing, handling, or transporting hazardous materials.8' Does the
employer's immunity extend to that liability? The Supreme Court answered that
76. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Anco Insulation, Inc., 450 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
Compare Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So. 2d 994 (La. 1996).
77. 617 So. 2d 477 (La. 1993).
78. La. R.S. 23:1201 (Supp. 1995).
79. Gagnard v. Baldridge, 612 So. 2d 732 (La. 1993).
80. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4.
81. Former La. Civ. Code art 2315.3, repealed by 1996 La. Acts No. 2.
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question in the negative in the highly controversial case of Billiot v. B. P. Oil
Co.,' ruling that an employer whose conduct was "wanton" or "reckless8 3 in
the handling of a hazardous substance was liable to its employee for punitive
damages." The result has been legislatively overturned not once, but twice;
first, the legislature amended the employer immunity statute"3 to overrule
Billiot. Then, in 1996, the legislature8" repealed Civil Code article 2315.3,
which provided for punitive damages in hazardous materials cases.87
There is one other way in which the employer may lose its immunity.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 provides immunity to the injuring employee
who is in the "normal" course of employment. What if the injuring employee
is in the course and scope of his employment for the purposes of respondeat
superior, but the injured employee is not in the "normal" course of his
employment for the purpose of employer immunity under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1032? In such a scenario, the employer theoretically can be liable
to the injured employee for tort damages caused by a merely negligent co-
employee. The "manner' of harm is such that the injured employee may
proceed in tort.
The workplace injury to the employee also may cause harm to the
employee's family members. If the employee is killed, some family members
may be compensated through the worker compensation scheme, and the employer
correspondingly is immune from tort suit by those family members.8 But what
if the family member is not compensated, such as where the employee is killed
but the family member is a non-dependent, or where the employee is only
injured? The classic case is the loss of consortium claim by the spouse of an
injured worker. The early jurisprudence holds that the employer's immunity
extends to the consortium claims, 9 but that result is suspect, both in its logic
and in the light of language in Billiot v. B. P. Oil Co. The logic of extending
employer immunity to consortium claims is based upon the assumption that the
consortium claim is "derivative" of the worker's personal injury claim; since the
82. 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994).
83. Such conduct, somewhere between negligence and intent, requires a showing that the
injuring employer or co-employee was "consciously indifferent" to the harm that his conduct would
cause the injured employee or that the defendant acted in a highly unreasonable manner in the face
of a grave risk of harm.
84. 1995 La. Acts No. 432 amended La. R.S. 23:1032(A)(l)(a) to provide that except for
intentional acts the employee's compensation benefits "shall be exclusive of all other ... claims for
damages, including ... punitive or exemplary damages, unless such ... damages are created by a
statute, whether now existing or created in the future, expressly establishing same as available to such
employee."
85. 1995 La. Acts No. 432.
86. See, e.g., Lyon v. Cobena, 391 So. 2d 8 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
87. 1996 La. Acts No. 2.
88. See, e.g., Minvielle v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 766 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1985).
89. See, e.g., Mundy v. Kulkoni, Inc. 503 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987); Minvielle v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co.. 766 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1985).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
employer is immune from the root claim, it also is immune from the derivative
claim. This rationale arguably is logical in the common law jurisdictions in
which the consortium claim developed as part of the trauma victim's loss of his
wife's services, which the common law treated as the trauma victim's "property."
Even in those jurisdictions, however, calling the claim "derivative" can be
viewed as legal technicality. In Louisiana, the consortium claim sprang full-
blown from 1982 legislation,90 and the "derivative" argument is specious. The
injured worker's spouse may sustain real damage because of the worker's injury
but is not necessarily compensated out of the injured worker's compensation
benefits. In addition, and most importantly, in Billiot the Supreme Court
indicated that the employer's immunity extended only to those claims which
existed at the time the legislature established the immunity-1914.9' Thus the
immunity arguably should not extend to the consortium claim which was created
by statute several generations later. Perhaps the fairest result would be to allow
consortium claims for those elements of consortium for which the injured
employee is not compensated by worker compensation, such as the consortium
plaintiff's loss of society. This is the result the United States Fifth Circuit court
of appeals reached in maritime cases before a 1991 Supreme Court case92 which
has been interpreted to limit consortium claims in maritime law.93
What about the mental anguish claims of the injured Louisiana worker's
family? There are two important factual scenarios in which family member
mental anguish claims may arise. One is where the worker's family member
witnesses the worker's workplace accident or comes upon the scene shortly
thereafter. These events may give rise to a "bystander" mental anguish claim
under Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital " and Civil Code Article 2315.6. The
other possibility is when the employer's faulty conduct presents a "special
likelihood" of directly causing severe mental anguish to the employee's family
member. This situation arose in Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hospital 9s where
a hospital employee, while assisting in the restraint of a patient, was exposed to
the patient's body fluids. That night the employee returned home and engaged
in unprotected sex with his spouse. The following day, the employer advised the
90. 1982 La. Acts No. 202 amended La. Civ. Code art. 2315 to add the following language:
"Damages may include loss of consortium. service, and society, and shall be recoverable by the same
respective categories of persons who would have had a cause of action for wrongful death of an
injured person."
91. 645 So. 2d at 606.
92. Miles v. Apex Marine, 498 U.S. 19, 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990).
93: Any effect Miles may have had on consortium claims may have been drastically limited
by Yamaha v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct . 619 (1996).
94. 556 So. 2d 559 (La. 1990).
95. 630 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 860 (1994) (although the
consortium claim was barred, the wife did have a claim for injuries attributable to her fear of
developing AIDS from her husband who was exposed at the workplace; this was her own
independent tort claim); see also Raney v. Walter 0. Moss Regional Hospital, 629 So. 2d 485 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 635 So. 2d 1134, 637 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1994)).
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employee that the patient to whose body fluids the employee had been exposed
had AIDS. An appellate court concluded that the wife's claim for fear of
developing AIDS from the sexual relations with her husband did not fall within
the employer's workplace immunity. These mental anguish claims, either
"direct," as in Vallery," or "bystander," pursuant to Lejeune and Article 2315.6,
should not fall within the employer's immunity.
Through the lens of the ever-present duty/risk analysis, the consortium,
mental anguish, and "independent tort" suits all present "this plaintiff' issues.
Does this defendant, the employer, owe a tort duty to this non-employee plaintiff
who is a relative of the employee? Do the policies underlying the employer's
non-intentional tort immunity to the employee mandate or suggest the extension
of the immunity to this plaintiff who is not an employee but is related to the
employee? Not surprisingly, the manner of the occurrence and the injuries which
occur may practically, if not logically, explain the results in particular cases. In
the typical consortium case the "manner" of the injury is trauma to the worker
caused by a non-intentional work place tort. The injuries suffered by the non-
employee relative are indirect-they result solely from the employee's injuries,
i.e., loss of society with or fear for the safety of the employee. Most courts have
denied these claims against the employer. But in the "independent tort" suits the
non-employee has his or her own injuries-i.e., fear of AIDS. These injuries are
his or her own and this manner is such that the non-employee has suffered his
or her own injuries. Courts have allowed these tort suits to proceed. Where do
the Article 2315.6 cases fit? There, the non-employee's injuries do result from
the work place injury itself but the non-employer's injuries are his or her own,
albeit psychic. While courts have not faced these issues, they should allow the
2315.6 claims to proceed in tort.
In some jurisdictions an employer may not be immune from an employee's
negligence action if the employer's fault is committed in ,some capacity other
than as the injured worker's employer." These usefully may be called "dual
capacity" cases. In such cases while "this defendant" is an employer, the
plaintiff alleges that because of the manner of the accident "this defendant" ought
not be treated like an employer entitled to claim immunity, but as a non-
employer. For tort purposes, the plaintiff alleges that defendant's capacity as
tortfeasor should trump its capacity as employer. Perhaps the paradigm "dual
capacity" case was where the plaintiff, employed as a sales person, was injured
when the heel of a shoe she had purchased from her employer collapsed, causing
her to fall on the employer's premises during her work shift. Plaintiff brought
a tort action against her employer, arguing that the employer's immunity did not
apply because she was suing it as the shoe's manufacturer and not as her
96. The logic of Vallery is not limited to mental anguish cases but applies to other "direct"
injuries as well. See Trahan v. Trans-Louisiana Gas Co., Inc., 618 So. 2d 30 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1993).
97. See, e.g., Shelly v. Johns ManvilleCorp., 798 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1986).
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employer. Although some other states had accepted the "dual capacity" doctrine
and arguably would have allowed the plaintiffs tort suit to proceed, the
Louisiana appellate court rejected the doctrine and maintained the employer's tort
immunity." A few years later, however, the Supreme Court embraced the
doctrine in Ducote v. Albert." There the plant physician, a salaried employee,
allegedly committed malpractice upon a co-employee who had suffered a
workplace injury. The physician met the patient/employee's tort damage suit
with the contention that if he were negligent, he was immune as plaintiff's co-
employee. The Supreme Court rejected the defense, observing that:
The dual capacity doctrine comports with the policy of the Louisiana
Worker's Compensation Law.... When a company doctor aggravates
injuries suffered previously by an employee, it is not an inevitable risk
inherent in the production process. The same risk would exist if the
employee sought private treatment away from the workplace.'0
°
In response to Ducote, the legislature in 1989 amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032 to provide that, "[t]his exclusive remedy is exclusive of all claims,
including any claims that might arise against his employer, or any principal or any
officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal
under any dual capacity theory or doctrine.''. The amendment came before the
Supreme Court in Stelly v. Overhead Door Company of Baton Rouge.'02 There,
the employer rented the workplace premises from the owner and, as is customary,
contractually assumed responsibility for conditions of the premises pursuant to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3221.103 Employee, injured because of an allegedly
defective condition of the premises, sued the employer in tort. Employer contended
that it was immune, and employee countered with the "dual capacity" doctrine. The
Court imposed tort liability upon the employer, holding that the amendment to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 was not retroactive and that the pre-amendment
immunity did not shield an employer who contractually assumed the liability of an
otherwise liable third party for an unintentional tort. Critically, the court stated that
the "dual capacity doctrine ... has never encompassed contractually assumed
liability. It has consistently been limited to situations involving liability imposed
by law due to legal capacity or status in addition to that of employer."'"°
Although Stelly applied the pre-amendment law, the result may be the same in post-
98. Tomasich v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 415 So. 2d 1002 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 420 So. 2d 446 (1982). See also Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d
599 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
99. 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988).
100. Id. at 403.
101. La. K.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1995).
102. The legislative abrogation of strict liability, 1996 La. Acts No. 1, has reduced the practical
impact of La. K.S. 9:3221 (1991) and the decision in Stelly.
103. 646 So. 2d 905 (La. 1994).
104. Id. at 911.
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amendment cases. In Stelly the Court observed in a footnote that: "we decline to
address the impact of the post-amendment version [Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1032] on this action and/or whether the statute refers to Louisiana's traditional
dual capacity doctrine or a more expansive version of the doctrine.""s The
reference to the "traditional" dual capacity doctrine is no doubt a reference to dual
capacity involving "liability imposed by law," not "contractually assumed liability."
Restated slightly, if the employer has contractually assumed responsibility for the
premises, the manner of the accident (and surrounding circumstances) is such that
this defendant may not be treated as an employer, but rather as any other
lessee.'
From a policy perspective, the result in Stelly may represent the best among a
number of poor choices. The law should encourage the maintenance of a safe
workplace by those who are in the best position to do so. Where the danger is a
physical condition of the workplace premises, the employee usually is in a poor
position to remedy the defect. The non-employer, lessor/owner of the premises
may be in a better position than the employee, but imposing liability upon him
would either erode the traditional relationship between lessor and tenant (to reduce
its exposure, the lessor probably would retain significant control over the leased
premises during the term of the lease), or would effectively place the burden upon
the employer (the lessor would require employer indemnification funded by
insurance). Moreover, the lessor may not be in a good position to detect and
remedy any dangerous conditions caused by the employer/lessee's subsequent
alteration of the premises. Thus, in many cases the employer is in the best position
to guard against unreasonably dangerous conditions on the work premises. But,
arguably, the employer's liability for worker's compensation does not provide him
with sufficient incentive to significantly improve the safety of the workplace
premises, because the employer faces only limited, and not full, liability under
worker's compensation. Thus, the best choice may be to impose tort liability upon
the employer're
In Wright v. State of Louisiana, o an unusual case reminiscent of the dual
capacity doctrine, the negligently injuring co-employees were denied immunity
105. Id. at 912 n.9.
106. The Stelly approach, and the judicial limitation upon the "dual capacity" doctrine, may be
stretched to extend to the not unusual cases in which the employer by contract assumes responsibility
for the injuries to his employees. Because the employer has assumed by contract the principal's tort
obligation to the employee, it may be argued under Stelly that he is not immune from a tort suit by
the injured employee. Such a result would be unfortunate. See, e.g., Harris v. Housing Authority
of Mansfield, 665 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
107. This is arguably true in all cases, not just those where the employer has contractually
assumed responsibility for the work premises under La. R.S. 9:3221 (1991). In a case involving a
La. R.S. 9:3221 clause filed against the premises owner, the third circuit refused to give effect to the
clause because to enforce the clause would impermissibly shift the employer's immunity from the
employer lessee to the non-employer lessor. Wallace v. Helmer Directional Drilling, Inc., 641 So.
2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
108. 639 So. 2d 258 (La. 1994).
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from a negligence action by their injured co-employee. The plaintiff, a hospital
security guard, was injured in a compensable workplace accident which
necessitated compensable surgery by a health care provider of plaintiffs choice.
Plaintiff chose physicians who worked at the same hospital as he did, and they
allegedly committed malpractice upon plaintiff. The court held that the
physicians were not immune because plaintiff was not being treated by the
doctors pursuant to a benefit or requirement of his employment. However, the
case may best be explained on a "course and scope" basis, i.e., plaintiff was not
engaged in employment at the time of the injury-the operation. The "manner"
of the injury was such that tort, rather than immunity, governed.
Three other inroads into employer immunity deserve mention. In Cox v.
Glazer Steel Corp., °9 the employer refused to reemploy a worker who was
handicapped; the "handicap" was caused by a prior workplace accident for which
the employer had paid worker compensation benefits. The court held that the
worker compensation immunity did not prevent the employee from recovering
under the Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Workers. The policy of enforcing
the Civil Rights Act overrule the immunity paradigm. In Weber v. State,"'
another case recognizing tort recovery against an employer, the court carved out
what it called a "narrow" exception to tort immunity: where the employer, in
bad faith, refuses to provide necessary medical treatment for a compensable
injury. A third exception to the employer's immunity from negligence actions
which will no doubt attract future attention is the employee's claim for spoliation
arising from the employer's breach of a post-accident promise to preserve the
remains of the accident-causing property for use in the employee's third party
tort suit.I'
An issue which has attracted extensive legislative and judicial attention in
post-modem times is the determination of which persons are entitled to claim
employer immunity. The question is a this defendant question. Is the defendant
before the court entitled to be treated like an employer? Are the circumstances
such that the defendant should be accorded "employer" status which then defines
the duty owed-tort or compensation benefits? With several exceptions, an
"employment relationship" must exist between the injured worker and the
defendant. Thus the "payroll" (sometimes called direct or general) employer
usually will be liable for compensation benefits (and immune from non-
intentional tort liability) to his payroll employee accidentally injured in the
course and scope of employment. If the injured worker (or his direct or general
employer) is an independent contractor, the principal with whom the employer
has contracted ordinarily is not liable for worker compensation and is not entitled
to tort immunity.12  The key factor that should distinguish an independent
109. 606 So. 2d 518 (La. 1992).
110. 635 So. 2d 188 (La. 1994).
11i. Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
112. One important exception to the nle stated in text arises where the independent contractor
is engaged in manual labor. La. R.S. 23:1021(6) (1985).
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contractor from an employee is whether the principal (putative employer)
maintains the right to control the details of the work."' Exercise of actual
control of the details of the work should not be required. On the other hand, the
general right of control or final approval should not be sufficient. In many
markets, the principal, through his economic power, will have the practical "say
so" on many of the contractor's decisions about the work, but this should not
translate into control of the details of the work. Even when there is a true
principal/contractor relationship, the principal is liable for worker compensation
benefits if a substantial part of the independent contractor's work time under the
contract is spent in manual labor."" In such a case, the principal enjoys tort
immunity.
Where the injured employee is not an independent contractor or the
employee of an independent contractor, he usually will be a direct or "payroll"
employee of the principal-employer, and, as noted, immunity applies if the injury
occurs in the course and scope of employment and the injuring conduct is not
intentional. There are two situations, however, in which one person may be
liable for the worker compensation benefits due to the direct employee of
another, and consequently, immune from a tort suit by that other's employee.
One is when the principal becomes a "borrowing employer" of a direct or
"payroll" employee of another." 5 This is one prong of the "borrowed servant"
doctrine. For instance, it is a custom in the oil industry for "labor contractors"
to provide crews of workers to drilling contractors. During their work shifts, the
labor contractor's "employees" report to and perform the tasks assigned to them
by the drilling contractor's supervisory employees. Under those circumstances,
the drilling contractor clearly becomes the "borrowing employer," and is liable
for worker compensation benefits (although the labor contractor usually secures
compensation), and is entitled to immunity from tort liability. These ongoing
relationships should be distinguished from others in which a contractor "loans"
an employee to another contractor working on the same project to assist in the
performance of a specific task or for a relatively brief period of time. That kind
of short term "cooperation" between contractors may not create "borrowing
employer" status and trigger immunity for the "borrower.""' 6 Determining
when a servant becomes sufficiently "borrowed" to be considered a "borrowed
servant" is not always easy. Some of the factors which have been suggested as
dispositive include the length of time of the "loan," the employee's reasonable
expectations under the circumstances, and the custom in that particular industry.
The other situation in which one may be liable for worker's compensation
benefits to, and immune from, a non-intentional tort claim brought by a non-
113. See Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Co., 262 So. 2d 385 (La. 1972).
114. La. R.S. 23:1021(6) (1985).
115. See, e.g., Brumbaugh v. Marfithon Oil Co., 507 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
508 So. 2d 824 (1987). See also Billeaud v. Poledore, 603 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 608 So. 2d 176 (1992).
116. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Howard Trucking Co., Inc., 427 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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payroll employee is when the "statutory employer" doctrine applies." 7 Once
again, the doctrine presents a this defendant question. The history of the
"statutory employer" concept in Louisiana and in other states is helpful in
understanding its reach. American legislatures which adopted worker compensa-
tion schemes during the first part of the twentieth century feared that employers
would attempt to circumvent the absolute liability those schemes imposed by
interjecting between themselves and their workers intermediary entities which
would not secure compensation or otherwise meet an employer's worker
compensation obligations."' To assure a compensation remedy to injured
workers, legislatures provided that some principals were by statute deemed, for
the purposes of liability for compensation benefits, the employers of employees
of other entities. The legislative approaches varied. In many jurisdictions, the
only "statutory employer" was a contractor who subcontracted out part of the
work it had contracted to perform. Under this "two contract" theory, the general
contractor is contingently liable for the worker compensation benefits of the
subcontractor's employees and is entitled to tort immunity if he in fact is
compelled to pay those benefits.
Louisiana adopted a broad version of the statutory employer concept,
providing that a principal is liable for worker compensation benefits under the
"two contract" theory or if the contract work is part of the principal's "trade,
business, or occupation."'" 9 Most significantly, under the Louisiana version,
the Supreme Court held, in Thibodeaux v. Sun Oil Co.,2 ' that a defendant was
immune from a tort suit as a "statutory employer" even though worker
compensation benefits were in fact paid by the employee's direct or "payroll"
employer and not by the statutory employer. Thus, the employer received the
benefit of the immunity without directly paying compensation benefits.
In many cases, the "statutory employer" issue is easily resolved by
application of the "two-contract" theory. However, where the person claiming
the immunity is not a general contractor and the victim is not an employee of the
subcontractor, immunity turns upon a determination of what is the principal's
"trade, business or occupation." That determination has not been an easy one to
make.' 2
117. La. R.S. 23:1032, 1061 (Supp. 1995). This defense is also known as the "Section 6"
employer, in memory of the section of the original worker's comp section which created the
"statutory employer." See, e.g., Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
118. See, e.g., Rowe v. Northwestern National Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 226, 229 (La. 1985).
119. La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1995).
120. 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950).
121. The difficulty in defining a vague phrase like "trade, business or occupation" coupled with
the automatic immunity available without the actual payment of benefits have made the "statutory
employer" doctrine one of the most litigated in Louisiana workplace tort suits. Those suits and the
legislative response to them have become a crucial battlefield, both in the legislative and judicial
arenas, between the competing interests of business and labor. Barnes v. Sun Oil Co., 362 So. 2d
761 (La. 1978).
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The Supreme Court's early struggles with the issue generated what are
arguably two lines of authority: a principal is a statutory employer of the
plaintiff if the work in which the plaintiff (or his employer) was engaged (the
contract work) was (1) an "essential" or "integral" part of the principal's
business,' 22 or (2) was "customarily" done by the principal and/or by others
similarly situated."z  One could persuasively argue that the "essential" and
"integral" tests were different, and that there were really three lines of authority.
However, most courts assumed that the words "integral" and "essential" were
alternative methods of describing the same concept.124  Importantly, the
"integral/essential'? test often led to a broad immunity, as courts reasoned that
any work which was necessary to allow the principal to engage in its trade,
business, or occupation was part of that trade, business, or occupation.
In Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Services, Inc.,12 1 the United
States Fifth Circuit perceived a conflict in the jurisprudence between the "inte-
gral/essential" and "customary" tests and by certified question asked the State
Supreme Court to answer this question:
1. What is the effect of Reeves v. Louisiana and Arkansas Ry., 282 So.
2d 503 (La. 1973), on the "essential to business test?" See Freeman v.
Chevron Oil Co., 517 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1975); Arnold v. Shell Oil Co.,
419 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1969).
a. In determining whether a plaintiff is a statutory employee under La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1061, would the Louisiana Supreme Court use that
test to determine whether certain activity is "part [of an employer's]
trade, business, or occupation?"'
26
The Supreme Court's response was puzzling: "Decline. The jurisprudence of
this Court does not warrant an additional pronouncement at this time. See
Reeves v. Louisiana and Arkansas Ry., 282 So. 2d 503 (La. 1973); Lushute v.
Diesi, 354 So. 2d 179 (La. 1978); La. Sup. Ct. Rules XII, Sec. 1.1'
27
The Reeves case was the one which arguably had substituted the "customary
operations" test for the "essential/integral" test. The Lushute case, as the Fifth
Circuit subsequently pointed out," 8 did not appear relevant to the question.
With the proverbial "ball" back in its court, the Fifth Circuit fashioned this
test for "trade, occupation or business": the "essential to business test" was no
longer controlling but was merely a factor to be considered. The first consider-
ation was whether the particular principal involved customarily did the type of
work performed by the contractor, or whether the contractor's work was an
122. Thibodeaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453, 49 So. 2d 852 (1950).
123. Reeves v. Louisiana and Arkansas Ry., 282 So. 2d 503 (La. 1973).
124. Id.
125. 590 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1979).
126. Id. at 598.
127. Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Services, 371 So. 2d 265 (La. 1979).
128. Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor Services, 613 F.2d 65, 69 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980).
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integral part of the work customarily performed by the principal, and if either
situation existed, there was a statutory employment relationship. If not, then the
court had to determine if others engaged in businesses similar to that of the
principal customarily did the type of work or if it was an integral part of their
businesses. '
2
In the ensuing years, many Louisiana courts applied the Blanchard test in
deciding the "trade, occupation or business" issue. Then, in 1986, the Supreme
Court confronted the issue in Berry v. Holston Well Service, Inc.,'" The Berry
court propounded this test:
1) The first inquiry was whether the contract work was "special-
ized per se." This was a question of fact, determined by a consideration
of whether the work required a degree of skill, training, experience,
education and/or equipment not normally possessed by those outside the
contract field. If the work was specialized per se, the defendant was
not a statutory employer.
2) If the contract work was not "specialized per se," the contract
work was to be compared with the principal's trade, business, or
occupation, to determine if the former was part of the latter. Among
the guidelines in resolving this factual issue:
a. Was the contract work routine and customary, i.e., "regular
and predictable?"
b. Did the principal have the equipment and/or manpower
capable of performing the contract work? ("Here the primary
focus is on determining whether the contract work as relates to
the principal is handled ordinarily through employees.'..)
c. Did industry participants normally contract out this type of
work, or did they have their own employees perform this
work?
3) Finally, the principal must have been engaged in the work at the
time of the alleged accident. If it was not, then the defendant could not
be a statutory employer.
The advantage of the Berry test was that it provided some certainty. The
first ("specialized per se") and third (engaged at the time of injury) inquiries
were "litmus" tests. If either one of those tests was resolved against the
defendant, he was not a statutory employer. The middle prong, resembling the
Reeves/Blanchard test, was a flexible/multi-factor test. The difficulty with the
Berry test was that the first and third prongs might lead to the denial of
immunity for work which was clearly part of the principal's trade, occupation or
business.
129. Id. at 71.
130. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
131. Id. at 938.
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Post-Berry jurisprudence focused primarily upon the first prong, and there
was a plethora of judicial decisions classifying certain work as specialized per
se or not. Before the Supreme Court had the opportunity to untangle these and
other issues raised by Berry, the legislature stepped in. In 1989, it amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:106132 to provide that:
The fact that work is specialized or nonspecialized, is extraordinary
construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually done by
contract or by the principal's direct employee, or is routine or unpredict-
able, shall not prevent the work undertaken by the principal from being
considered part of the principal's trade, business or occupation,
regardless of whether the principal has the equipment or manpower
capable of performing the work.'3
The language of the amendment may have been a carefully chosen compromise
but if it was intended to overrule Berry, it was at best inartfully drafted. First,
the legislature arguably amended the wrong statute. It is not Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:1061 but Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 which provides
immunity to the statutory employer. The legislature did not amend Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1032, so the language of that statute (in this relevant respect)
is the same as it was when Berry was decided. Secondly, the language does not
reject the Berry factors, but simply provides that no one of those factors shall
"prevent the work ... from being considered part of the principal's trade,
business or occupation."
The statute does make one clear change: the "litmus" aspects of the first
and third prongs of the Berry test are no more. Beyond that, it was not clear
what the 1989 amendment meant. The U.S. Fifth Circuit, without bothering to
certify the question, concluded that after the 1989 amendment the Berry factors
could not even be considered by a court in determining the statutory employer
issue."3 That conclusion was not dictated by the language of the amendment
and was counterintuitive. The Berry factors arguably were the only ones relevant
to an assessment of the connexity of the principal's work to that of the
contractor. It is significant to note that the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 1989
amendment was intended to restore the pre-Berry "integral/essential" test
pronounced by the state Supreme Court in Thibodaux in 1950. However, the
Berry factors were developed by courts applying that same "integral/essential"
test to frequently recurring fact situations. The Fifth Circuit's decision also was
ironic because it foreclosed application of the Blanchard test which it developed
and which generally was accepted by Louisiana courts before Berry.
132. 1989 La. Acts No. 454.
133. La. R.S. 23:1061 (Supp. 1996).
134. Morgan v. Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994); Salsbury v. Hood
Industries, Inc., 982 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Harris v. Murphy Oil Co., U.S.A., 980 F.2d
991 (5th Cir. 1992); Kinsey v. Farmland Ihdustries, Inc., 39 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994).
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As they did with Blanchard, the state's lower courts generally followed the
U.S. Fifth Circuit's lead and applied Thibodaux and the "integral/essential"
test.' They regularly granted and affirmed summary judgments, determining
defendants were entitled to immunity as "statutory employers."'' Just as
regularly, the Supreme Court reversed those summary judgments and exceptions
of no cause of action.137 However, the Supreme Court had summarily done so,
without docketing the cases or hearing argument. Then, a divided five-judge
panel of the Second Circuit decided Kirkland v. Riverwood International USA,
Inc. 3 ' That court concluded that in determining the statutory employer issue,
a court was not precluded from considering the Berry factors but should decide
the "statutory employer" issue based on the "totality of the circumstances,"
including the factors identified in the middle prong of the Berry test. The
Supreme Court granted writs and affirmed.'39
In affirming, the Supreme Court endorsed the logic and spirit of the court
of appeal decision. The court held that the 1989 amendment to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1061, rather than returning Louisiana to the "integral" or
"essential to the business" test, primarily was intended to overrule that part of
Berry "dealing with specialization per se and to declare that a finding of
specialization is not determinative of a statutory employment relationship."''
The court concluded that the "appropriate standard under amended Section 1061
for determining whether the contract work is part of the principal's trade,
business or occupation is for the court to consider all pertinent factors under the
totality of the circumstances."'' Giving lower courts further guidance, the
court listed the relevant factors for consideration:
(1) The nature of the business of the alleged principal;
(2) Whether the work was specialized or non-specialized;
135. See Deal v. International Paper Co., 632 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 2d Cir.), rev'd, 637 So. 2d 453
(1994); Hanks v. Shell Oil Co., 631 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'd, 635 So. 2d 1118 (1994);
Picardv. Zeit Petroleum Exploration Co., Inc., 636 So. 2d 922 (La. App. Ist Cir.), rev d, 642 So. 2d 862
(1994); Moore v. Crystal Oil Co., 626 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993), rev 'd, 632 So. 2d 758 (1994).
The court concluded there were factual issues which precluded summary judgment. Various justices
(Retired Justice Hall. Justice Kimball, and Chief Justice Calogero) have argued that the cases should be
docketed for full argument. Despite these summary reversals at least one court of appeal has adhered
to the integral relation test. McNally v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc.. 650 So. 2d 267 (La. App. I st
Cir. 1994). Cf. Favron v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 649 So. 2d 983 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994) (factual
issues prevent summary judgment on statutory employer defense). See also Moffett v. Buck Kreihs Co.,
Inc., 654 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 656 So. 2d 1021 (1995) (night security at a dock
is part of vessel repairer's trade, business, or occupation).
136. See supra note 134.
137. See supra note 135.
138. 658 So. 2d 715 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted, 661 So. 2d 1370 (1995).
139. Kirkland v. Riverwood International USA, No. 95-C-1830, 1996 WL 523694 (La. Sept. 13,
1996). Justice Kimball, id. at **8 (Kimball, J., dissenting), and Justice Victory, id. at **i0 (Victory,
J., dissenting), dissented.
140. Id. at **7.
141. Id.
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(3) Whether the contract work was routine, customary, ordinary, or
usual;
(4) Whether the alleged principal customarily used his own employees
to perform the work, or whether he contracted out all or most of such
work;
(5) Whether the alleged principal had the equipment and personnel
capable of performing the contract work;
(6) Whether those in similar businesses normally contract out this type
of work or whether they have their own employees perform the work;
(7) Whether the direct employer of the claimant was an independent
business enterprise who insured his own workers and included that cost
in the contract; and
(8) Whether the principal was engaged in the contract work at the time
of the incident."
2
Noting the fact intensive nature of the inquiry, the court expressly referred
to the issue of statutory employer status as a "factual issue to be resolved on a
case-by-case basis."" 3 As such, the court noted that the statutory employer
inquiry would be "frequently difficult to accomplish on motion for summary
judgment.... ."'"
The apparent inability of both the legislature and the judiciary to stabilize
the law governing the "statutory employer" defense may be due, in part, to the
perplexing policy choices it presents. The apparent reason for creating the
defense was the quid pro quo, i.e., imposition of liability for worker compensa-
tion benefits upon a principal who chose to do part of his business through a
separate and independent business entity which was unable to pay those benefits
to its injured employees. But that is no longer a societal problem. In nearly all
cases, the injured employee's direct employer will have secured compensation;
rarely is a contractor permitted to commence work upon the principal's premises
without first proving that he has done so.
Resort to policy does not produce any clear answer. The injured employee
will, in almost all cases, be entitled to worker compensation benefits. But
worker's compensation provides only limited compensation. Thus, one real issue
is full compensation to the injured employee. The countervailing fairness
argument is that the statutory employer in reality may pay at least a part of the
employee's worker compensation through the contract price with the direct
employer. Yet, if the principal is not given immunity, -then he, unlike the direct
employer, is liable for non-intentional torts to the employee. If, as one ordinarily
can assume, the cost of worker compensation benefits is passed to the principal
through the contract price (see the Kirkland court's seventh factor), then the risk




of the employee's injury is being borne by the enterprise in which the principal
is engaged, regardless of how closely it is connected with that enterprise.
Another relevant factor is deterrence of workplace accidents. The principal
in fact exercises some control over the workplace, but in many instances he
cannot be expected to know whether the direct employer is conducting the
operation in as safe a manner as possible. One of those instances is when the
direct employer's work is "specialized." Berry denied statutory employer status
where the work was specialized and the principal engaged the direct employer
to perform it because the principal had no idea how it could safely be done.
However, Berry's comparison with the actions of others in the industry on non-
specialized work could make the principal immune although he was in a better
position than the direct employer to avoid the harm. Thus, the "trade, business,
or occupation" tests which developed may have immunized the principal when
he was in a position to avert the workplace accident and impose tort liability
upon him when he was not! Whether Kirkland's totality of the circumstances
test avoids this potential pitfall remains to be seen.
Perhaps the real difficulty with the "statutory employer" defense is that it is
a fact-specific inquiry and, thus, may not be the proper subject for a categorical
"immunity" defense. If the principal is not treated as an immune statutory
employer, a fact-specific inquiry must be made to determine if, under all of the
circumstances, his conduct (or inaction) presented an unreasonable risk of harm
to the employee. As Kirkland recognizes, whether the work was specialized and
whether the principal also engaged in it with its own workers at the particular
time should be relevant to that inquiry. However, it may be simpler and more
analytically honest to simply ignore the immunity issue and treat the entire issue
as a negligence question. However, the statutory basis of the statutory employer
doctrine makes this simpler approach unavailable.
What if the workplace accident or the employment relationship has
connections with more than one sovereign? For example, an employee may be
hired in Louisiana to perform work in Texas. What if the laws of the two states
provide differing tort immunities to the direct employer, or different standards
for determining "borrowing employer" or the "statutory employer" status? The
issue will be resolved by application of Louisiana's new choice of law rules.
A more common problem in Louisiana is when the workplace accident or
the employment relationship, or both, have connections with both Louisiana and
maritime law. A maritime worker may be either a seaman, entitled to benefits
under the Jones Act,"' or a worker covered by the Longshore and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act.'4" Under the Jones Act, the employer is liable
to the employee in tort; 7 immunity is not an issue. Under the LHWCA,
145. 46 U.S.C. App. § 688(a) (1994).
146. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
147. The Jones Act adopts for seamen provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 51, et seq, which make the employer liable for tort damages if his negligence injures his
employee in the course and scope of the employment.
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however, the employer is liable for compensation benefits but is immune from
tort liability to the employee. 4 ' The LHWCA provides a comparatively
narrow "statutory employer" defense-a principal is a "statutory employer" only
if he is a contractor and plaintiff is an employee of his subcontractor, and only
if the contractor is in fact required to pay compensation benefits to the
subcontractor's employee."49 If a worker is injured in a maritime tort setting
and the worker is covered only by the LHWCA, the state statutory employer
defense is inapplicable. But what if the worker is covered by both the LHWCA
and state worker compensation? What if the injury occurs in circumstances in
which the tort is maritime? In which it is not? These scenarios have presented
perplexing problems, but final resolution apparently is at hand. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 23:1035.2 provides that a worker is not entitled to state worker
compensation if he is covered by a federal compensation scheme, including the
LHWCA. Thus, in theory, there can be no overlapping coverage. The remaining
problem is where the worker is covered by the LHWCA and is injured under
circumstances in which his underlying tort claim against a third person is
governed by state law, such as an injury on a fixed platform on the Outer
Continental Shelf or on a dock or wharf. While the law is not clear, the
emerging rule apparently is that the LHWCA's statutory employer immunity will
apply and will preempt the application of the state statutory employer de-
fense.'O
I1. CONCLUSION
The employer's immunity from tort is the most significant immunity issue
Louisiana courts face. It is the most widely applicable immunity and the most
frequently litigated. The litigation and resolution of these employment immunity
issues reveal the difficulties, both practical and philosophical, of attempting to
untie the knots at the borders where fault and no fault systems intertwine.
However, the employer immunity is also critical because it is the paradigm for
post-modern immunity statutes: the employer is liable for certain of his torts but
not all, i.e. the employer is immune from a negligence suit by its employer or
a strict liability suit but not an intentional tort suit. As such, the employer
immunity has provided the model for Louisiana's new wave of immunity statutes
which immunize various groups from liability for certain torts but not others.'
Additionally, as in all torts problems, the employer immunity setting presents
fine issues regarding the existence of a duty and its scope. Most notably,
employer immunity issues involve the manner in which the accident occurred
and whether a person, this defendant, should be accorded employer status for
148. 33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905 (1994).
149. Id.
150. See. e.g., Grantham v. Avondale Indus., Inc. 964 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1992); Strange v.
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, 262 So. 2d 799 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
151. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:571 (1991).
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purposes of the immunity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, resolution of
the employer immunity issues--course and scope, coverage, and who is entitled
to immunity-reveal a lot about how the Louisiana courts, most notably the
Supreme Court, have responded to limitations on tort recovery.
